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RESTRICTION OF TORT REMEDIES AND THE
CONSTRAINTS OF DUE PROCESS: THE RIGHT TO AN
ADEQUATE REMEDY
Tracy A. Thomas*
In the recent proliferation of tort reform statutes, the dangerous
clause of remedial jurisdiction stripping has sneaked into the law.
Reminiscent of federal statutes in other areas of the law,1 these
jurisdictional provisions strip courts of all power to award punitive or
non-pecuniary damages in excess of legislative limits.2 Many states
have acted to restrict frivolous claims and excessive recoveries by
cabining “McTorts” and “runaway juries.”3 Regardless of the merits of
these policy questions, the use of the simple expedient of remedial
jurisdiction to accomplish these purposes raises significant concerns. By
arbitrarily restricting an individual’s right to a meaningful remedy, the
tort reform remedy restrictions threaten to dilute common-law rights.
The systemic problems of restricting remedies through arbitrary state
action have concerned me in the past,4 and they are brought to the
*

Professor of Law, University of Akron. A special thanks to the participants in the 2005 Remedies
Forum for their insightful comments and reactions to this paper, and to Sarah Cravens and Stewart
Moritz for their valuable input on the article.
1. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
2. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.01 (2005) (“The court of common pleas shall not have
jurisdiction, in any tort action to which the amounts set forth apply, to award punitive or exemplary
damages that exceed [two times compensatories to a maximum of $350,000].”); id. §§ 2305.01 &
2315.18(E)(1) (limiting jurisdiction in tort action to award compensatory damages for noneconomic loss in excess of $250,000 or three times economic loss up to $500,000). Ohio adopted
the same jurisdiction stripping provision in its 1999 tort reform laws that were struck down in the
Sheward case. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
3. The poster children of tort reform have been the media images of unrestrained “runaway”
juries and frivolous lawsuits against McDonald’s for hot coffee and high-fat foods. See, e.g., Alex
Berenson, Vioxx Jury Adds More in Damages, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2006, at C1; Editorial, It’s
Lawyers’ Own Fault, SAN ANT. EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 23, 2005, at 6B (“[I]f lawyers’ greed and
liberal juries had not resulted in such ridiculously extravagant awards (i.e. the McDonald’s hot
coffee spill multimillion-dollar award), tort reform would not have been necessary.”); Howard
Wasserman, Fast Food Justice: Infamous Cases Involving French Fries, Obesity, Too-Hot Coffee,
and Fingertips (Oct. 6, 2005), available at http://www.findlaw.com/commentary .
4. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy
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forefront again with the advent of the latest generation of tort reform.
The legislative action of tort reform remedy stripping exhibits a
misuse of jurisdictional defining power. Using remedial jurisdiction to
control rights is arguably a convenient, politically acceptable way to
legislate disfavored rights.5 Such jurisdiction stripping at the federal
level has been used to attack remedies for desegregation, prisoners’ civil
rights, and habeas corpus.6 Its use as a legal maneuver is often
accompanied by little political fallout: for it seems politically expedient
to stop excessive payouts to prisoners (but not eliminate civil rights),7
and protect health insurance (but not immunize doctors).8 After all,
everyone knows coffee is hot, prisoners don’t live in hotels, and doctors
help people.
However, avoiding direct legislation upon these
substantive issues by sneaking in through the back door of remedies is
formalistically dishonest and insulates representatives from the political
accountability that should follow as a consequence of legislative action
in a democracy.
The pretextual use of jurisdiction to restrict remedies has serious
implications both within and outside of the tort reform context. The
maneuver exceeds the purpose and intent of the legislative power to
define and organize the judiciary. Such a violation of the spirit of
jurisdictional authority converts the legislature’s power to define the
jurisdiction of the courts into a plenary power to regulate, or eviscerate,
all remedies and legal rights. This unrestrained legislative power has
been challenged in the past as a violation of separation of powers.9 In
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004) (arguing that judicial denial of an adequate
remedy violates due process) [hereinafter Thomas, Ubi Jus]; Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5
Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673 (2001) (arguing that Congress’ restriction
of remedies under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides inadequate redress which
dilutes the individual’s constitutional right) [hereinafter Thomas, Remedial Rights].
5. David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted
Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1242 (2005) (“Targeting groups without political power or
support, Congress imposed wide-ranging limitations” on civil rights remedies. “There is a sad irony
in the fact that Congress (and the courts . . . ) have selectively limited rights for these ‘discrete and
insular minorities.’”).
6. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text; see Lloyd Anderson, Congressional
Control Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: The New Threat to James Madison’s
Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417 (2000) (discussing the many historical and modern attempts by
Congress to restrict federal court jurisdiction).
7. John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 429, 437 n.23 (2001) (noting that the sparse legislative history of the PLRA
consisted mainly of rhetorical assertions about the need for criminals to do “hard time,” prisoners
“churning out lawsuits with no regard to cost or merit,” and frivolous prisoner lawsuits over melted
ice cream and the wrong brand of sneakers).
8. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (2005) (Statement of Findings and Intent).
9. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1094-95 (Ohio 1999);
Theodore J. Weiman, Comment, Jurisdiction Stripping, Constitutional Supremacy and the
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response, legislatures have tried to circumvent these structural barriers
by using their jurisdictional power to shackle the judiciary’s ability to
act.
This article identifies another counterbalancing power that checks
the legislative ability to restrict tort remedies through tort reform: the
due process clauses of both state and federal constitutions. Pursuing this
uncharted line of inquiry, this article argues that due process guarantees
provide a restraint on the tort remedy stripping provisions that deny
plaintiffs their fundamental right to a meaningful remedy. Building
upon prior work asserting the fundamentality of the right to a remedy,10
this article develops the correlative due process protection mandating
heightened review of legislation that burdens or denies the remedial
right. This constitutional scrutiny is necessary to hold the legislature
accountable to constitutional commands and to provide the necessary
transparency and respect for the rule of law.
Pulling together the disparate strands of legal rules in existing case
law, the article develops a cohesive theory of due process protection for
the right to an adequate remedy. State court decisions invalidating tort
reform remedy restrictions appear analytically scattered and based upon
seemingly narrow doctrinal rules of “quid pro quo,” “due course of law,”
or access to the courts.11 However, upon closer consideration, these
cases reveal a common theoretical foundation emanating from due
process.12 When these decisions are compared to U.S. Supreme Court
decisions spanning the twentieth century, the right to an adequate and
meaningful judicial remedy emerges even more clearly.13 Locating this
due process requirement of an adequate remedy significantly alters the
way in which courts currently assess the legality of tort reform
legislation. Such a heightened standard does not necessarily sound the
death knell for tort reform, but it does demand a more substantial basis
for restricting remedies, and it averts the political obfuscation of the
significant remedial issues dominating tort reform today.
I. JURISDICTION BY ANY OTHER NAME, IS STILL JURISDICTION?
It should come as no surprise that state legislatures are using
Implications of Ex Parte Young, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1677 (2005); Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform’s
Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 835 (2002); Matthew W. Light, Note, Who’s
the Boss? Statutory Damage Caps, Courts, and State Constitutional Law, 58 WASH. & LEE. L. REV.
315, 316 (2001).
10. See Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4; see also infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
11. See Light, supra note 9.
12. See infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction-stripping measures to curtail the power of the courts to
award tort remedies. The interbranch tension over tort reform remedies
is nothing new. As Professor Janutis discusses in her article, political
powers have been fighting since the early nineteenth century over
legislative restriction of judicial remedies.14 In recent time, the judiciary
and legislature in Ohio have gone round and round for the last two
decades as the courts have repeatedly struck down tort reform statutes
and judicial careers have been made and lost on the issue.15 Tired of
polite requests to the judiciary to “reconsider its holding,” the lawmakers
have resorted to the legislative death penalty of jurisdiction stripping to
deprive the courts of any possible ability to ignore the legislative
mandates. 16
The use of a jurisdiction stripping provision rather than a remedial
restriction clearly signals the legislative intent for an absolute
prohibition on certain damages. The use of the structural tool prohibits
any reasoned exception or deviation from the caps, such as those
sometimes seen in civil rights cases.17 The jurisdictional provision
encourages collateral attacks for any damages award in excess of the
cap, thereby weakening the interstate viability of state judgments. In
short, the jurisdictional weapon silences the legislative/judicial dialogue
over tort remedies by shutting down one side of the discussion.
This structural attempt to silence the judiciary’s influence over law
where legislative and judicial policies differ is also seen at the federal
level.18 Conventional wisdom has held that Congress rarely, if ever,
14. Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle Over Tort Reform and the Overlooked Legacy of the
Progressives and Populists, 39 AKRON L. REV. (2007); see also John Nockleby & Shannon Currier,
100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021
(2005).
15. Michael Scherer, State Judges for Sale, THE NATION, Sept. 2, 2002 (discussing how Ohio
Justice Alice Robie Resnick was targeted in the 2000 election because of her majority opinion in the
4-3 Sheward decision invalidating tort reform a second time); see also Jim Copland, Turning Out
Trial Lawyers, etc., NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.nationalreview.com
(“Tort reformers also scored big wins Tuesday in state judicial races. Judicial elections are a key
component of litigation reform: Not only do judges make decisions on litigation, but ‘creative’
judges in many states have struck down tort-reform laws passed by state legislatures.”).
16. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (2005) (Statement of Legislative Intent) (“The Ohio
General Assembly respectfully requests that the Ohio Supreme Court . . . reconsider its holding on
damage caps in State v. Sheward (1999).”); Stephen J. Werber, Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform
Versus State Constitutional Mandates, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1045, 1065 (2001) (“The [tort reform]
picture was completed by an amendment declaring that the Ohio Court of Common Pleas had no
jurisdiction to award compensation for non-economic loss. . . . Talk about chutzpah!”).
17. See Caprice L. Roberts, Ratios, (Ir)rationality, and Civil Rights Punitive Damages, 39
AKRON L. REV. (2006).
18. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: “Three String
Serenade”, 51 VILL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com; Anderson,
supra note 6, at 419, 434 (“It should be emphasized that the issue of congressional control over
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restricts federal court jurisdiction, though it often threatens and postures
such action.19 However, a recent empirical study challenges this
accepted notion, and establishes, to the contrary, that Congress regularly,
and with increasing frequency, strips jurisdiction from the federal
courts.20 Indeed, the structural weapon of jurisdiction stripping has been
used to attack unpopular injunctive remedies involving unions, abortion,
desegregation, immigration, and prisons.21 During the height of the
school desegregation cases, President Nixon made several proposals to
Congress to enact bans on court busing orders.22 Congress has restricted
the courts’ jurisdiction to order the habeas corpus remedy,23 and most
recently acted to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
constitutional challenges related to the Guantanamo Bay detentions.24 In
prison conditions cases, Congress proposed in the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 to strip the federal courts of all power to award
structural injunctions; however, it ultimately enacted more narrow
qualifications for such injunctions in response to expressed

jurisdiction only arises in any significant way when Congress disagrees with judicial decisions.
When Congress is content with such decisions, it has no reason to launch serious attacks on the
power of the courts.”); Neil A. Lewis, Dismissal of Guantanamo Suits Sought, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 5, 2006, at 2 (noting that Congress acted to strip courts of jurisdiction to award habeas corpus
remedy for Guantanamo Bay detentions to counter the June 2004 decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court authorizing such relief). But see Dawn M. Chutkow, Jurisdiction Stripping: Ideology,
Institutional Concerns, and Congressional Control of the Court (Oct. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.ssrn.com (suggesting that Congress acts to remove jurisdiction for administrative
concerns such as reducing federal court caseloads).
19. Anderson, supra note 6, at 418; Chutkow, supra note 18, at 4.
20. Chutkow, supra note 18, at 4 & n.6.
21. See, e.g., Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1938) (upholding the NorrisLaGuardia Act and Congress’ power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal court by constraining the
court’s power to issue injunctions in labor cases); see Anderson, supra note 6, at 418 nn.6-7 (citing
examples of jurisdiction-stripping power used to prohibit certain injunctive remedies); Stephan O.
Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing Attacks on the Third Branch, 87 KY. L. J. 679, 730-40
(1999) (detailing remedial-stripping enactments of the early 1990s).
22. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower
Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 (1976). See also H.R. 3332,
97th Cong. (1981) (forbidding any federal court from requiring student attendance at school based
on race); H.R. 5200, 97th Cong. (1981) (limiting the authority of federal courts to order student
transportation or to alter local tax rates in school desegregation cases).
23. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (upholding provision eliminating appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for all “second or successive” habeas petitions); David Cole,
Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress’ Control of
Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481 (1998).
24. S. 1042, 108th Cong. (Nov. 10, 2005) (stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to issue
habeas corpus remedy for constitutional challenges related to the Guantanamo detention); Neil A.
Lewis, U.S. to Seek Dismissal of Guantanamo Suits, N.Y. TIMES, at A11 (Jan. 4, 2006) (reporting
that remedy stripping provision regarding Guantanamo detentions became law as part of the 2006
defense appropriations bill).
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constitutional concerns.25 Given this context, it is not surprising that
legislatures considering tort reform resort to the use of this powerful, and
increasingly common, jurisdictional weapon.
However, simply because legislators have crafted the remedy
stripping provisions of tort reform laws in terms of “jurisdiction” does
not necessarily make them jurisdictional. Morphing legal restrictions on
remedies into the shape of jurisdiction raises both formalistic and
structural concerns.26 At the formalistic level, calling law jurisdictional
when it is not confuses and perhaps masks the operation of the law.27 At
the structural level, the misuse of jurisdictional power threatens to
expand the limited legislative power to organize the courts into an allencompassing power to do whatever the legislature pleases.
Legislatures generally designate court jurisdiction.28 State courts,
like inferior federal courts, are limited to the jurisdiction that the
legislature may choose to bestow.29 As the Ohio Supreme Court held
almost one-hundred years ago, with respect to jurisdiction, “[t]he
legislative judgment in this behalf will not be nullified except when it
clearly appears that there has been a gross abuse of such discretion in
undoubted violation of some state or federal constitutional provision.”30
Jurisdiction is the designation of the court’s initial authority to hear
a case in the first instance.31 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Davis
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A); 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02 at S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996)
(statement of Associate Attorney General John Schmidt before the Senate Judiciary Committee
testifying that the proposed legislative restrictions on remedies “would raise serious constitutional
problems” under due process and separation of powers). See Theodore K. Cheng, Invading an
Article III Court’s Inherent Equitable Powers: Separation of Powers and the Immediate
Termination Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 981
(1999).
26. See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643 (2005)
(arguing that confusing jurisdiction with merits determinations in statutory analysis raises
procedural and formalistic concerns).
27. Cf. id. at 656 (making similar argument where factual issues going to the merits are
characterized as threshold questions of “jurisdiction”).
28. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1. See Humphreys v.
Putnam, 178 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ohio 1961); Finley v. Pfeiffer, 126 N.E.2d 57, 61 (Ohio 1955).
29. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); MARTIN H.
REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 83 (2d ed.
1990); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword, Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 25 (1980) (“Courts and
commentators agree that Congress’ discretion in granting jurisdiction to the lower federal courts
implies that those courts take jurisdiction from Congress and not from article III.”).
30. Williams v. Scudder, 131 N.E. 481 (Ohio 1921); accord Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 456 (“It
is well established that legislation cannot contravene the Constitution.”); Dayton v. State, 813 N.E.
2d 707, 728 (Ohio App. 2004) (citing Scancarello v. Erie Ins. Co., 1996 WL 421858, 3 (1996))
(commenting that under Ohio’s “system of checks and balances, the judiciary retains the power to
nullify legislative decisions if they violate a state or federal constitutional provision.”).
31. Wasserman, supra note 26, at 650.
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v. Passman, “jurisdiction” is whether a federal court has the
constitutional or statutory power to hear a case.32 Professor Howard
Wasserman has explained in some detail how jurisdiction operates as a
threshold question a court must resolve before it may proceed to hear the
case.33 The question of remedy is a separate one determining, at the end
of the case, whether there is a basis to award the litigant some specified
relief for the established violation of a legal right.34 “[T]he Court has
largely maintained a clear analytic distinction between jurisdiction, on
the one hand, and two other necessary components of a federal-court
lawsuit: a cognizable cause of action and the availability of an
appropriate judicial remedy.”35
Two recent Supreme Court cases support the precise analytical use
of the terminology and power of “jurisdiction.”36 In Eberhart v. United
States37 and Kontrick v. Ryan,38 the Court held that statutory time limits
for requesting a new trial are not “jurisdictional,” but rather “claimprocessing rules” that are mandatory procedure rules, which do not
implicate a court’s power to hear a case. The Court cautioned that the
imprecise use of the word “jurisdiction” has obscured the central
understandings of the operative rules.39 Despite some lack of clarity in
the past, the Court has now signaled its intent to use the term
“jurisdiction” carefully to mean only those “prescriptions delineating the
classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal
jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.”40
“Jurisdiction” by definition then is not a decision on the merits of a
case.41 Jurisdiction is a predicate to judicial action; it does not operate at
the end of the case as a result or decision of the court.42 Thus,
32. 442 U.S. 228 (1979); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
33. Wasserman, supra note 26, at 651.
34. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76
WASH. L. REV. 67 (2001).
35. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2001);
see also Zeigler, supra note 34.
36. Credit goes to Michael Allen for this point.
37. 126 S. Ct. 403 (2005) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) setting forth
time limits for a defendant’s motion for a new trial is not “jurisdictional”).
38. 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (holding that defenses made available by time limitations in the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are not “jurisdictional”).
39. Eberhart, 126 S.Ct. at 406.
40. Id. at 405; Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455.
41. Wasserman, supra note 26, at 650.
42. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128, 146-48 (1872). In Klein, the Court
invalidated a congressional jurisdictional statute that directed a rule of decision on the merits of
post-Civil War forfeitures. Id. The Court found that the statute did not operate to organize claims in
the normal jurisdictional fashion, but instead required the Court to reach a particular decision. “But
the court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence
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formalistically, what the tort reform statutes are doing by restricting a
factual decision about damages at the end of a case is simply not
“jurisdiction.” “The power of the court to hear and decide a case could
hardly be made to depend upon the jury’s verdict.”43 Misusing
“jurisdiction” raises concerns of positive law by mixing distinct legal
questions, thus adding to the confusion of the legitimacy of such
action.44
Fundamentally, jurisdiction is a rule of organization, not
decisionmaking. It exists for the purpose of organizing the courts by
subject matter in order to streamline cases and develop the expertise of
the courts. Thus, state legislatures commonly designate domestic
relations courts, juvenile courts, and small claims courts to direct the
stream of cases and develop expertise in the judges.45 Jurisdiction thus
serves a channeling function to direct the flow of cases to the proper
decisionmaking body.
The channeling function of jurisdiction is further illustrated by the
bases for federal jurisdiction. Claims can be brought in federal court
when a federal question is raised or when there is a diversity of
citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds a
designated sum.46 The normal result of these jurisdictional statutes is
that some claims will be channeled into federal court, while the
remaining claims will be adjudicated in state courts.47 As long as there
is access to some court for an important constitutional claim, “much of
our concern about legislation denying access to federal courts must
inevitably seem overblown.”48 Jurisdiction thus directs the litigation
traffic to the most appropriate court.
It is questionable whether the tort reform jurisdictional statutes are
should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely contrary.” Id. at 147. See Gordon G.
Young, A Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress’s Power to Restrict the
Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132, 157 (1995) (stating that Klein
involved “puppeteering” rather than “court-stripping” as the Court was given, not denied,
jurisdiction to act, and that jurisdiction was shaped to control the decision on the merits).
43. Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157,
166 (1953).
44. Wasserman, supra note 26, at 669-78.
45. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-273.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
47. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1215
(1988).
48. Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of Congress to Attack the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1410 (2000); Martin Redish, Constitutional Limitations
on Congressional Power to Control Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV.
143, 156 (1982) (arguing that restricting federal court jurisdiction to issue remedies is not
problematic as long as the state courts remain open and provide at least a technically adequate
forum).
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merely channeling certain cases of high value into federal court.
Diversity jurisdiction would give the federal court authority to resolve
tort claims of a high value, precisely the large dollar cases that are barred
by the jurisdictional limits on non-pecuniary damages. This result
parallels other federal statutes, like the federal class action statute, that
seemingly woo state tort plaintiffs into federal court.49 There is certainly
a question as to whether the federalization of tort law is a desired result,
and others have suggested that the move to federal court threatens
certain democratic values.50 Regardless of the normative conclusion as
to whether tort claims should be litigated in federal court, practically
speaking, there will be few cases that satisfy this option. Only a small
group of tort cases would satisfy the requirement of the diversity of
parties. For routine tort cases, like medical malpractice or automobile
accidents, it is more likely that diversity of citizenship will not be
shown, thus confining the case to state court.
Even if some tort cases are brought in federal court, there is a
question as to whether state or federal law would apply to the choice of
remedial law.51 The Supreme Court has been schizophrenic in its
holdings on this matter.52 In some cases, it has held that the state
remedial law applies as a substantive rule.53 In others, it has held that
the federal remedial law applies as a rule of procedure.54 However, in
looking at the holdings of cases that are most aligned with tort limits on
non-pecuniary damages, the conclusion is likely that the state law of
damages would apply to the state tort claim.55 If the state law of
damages is applied to the diversity case in federal court, then the choice
of a federal forum has no impact on the limitation of damages. The state
law capping the damages would still apply, prohibiting an award in
excess of the set amount.

49. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b); Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1997, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p & 78bb.
50. JoEllen Lind, Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37
AKRON L. REV. 717 (2004); Georgene M. Vairo, Is Forum Shopping Unethical?, LOY. LAWYER 4
(2005) (removal of cases to federal court to prevent state courts from providing relief for state law
claims “raises serious federalism problems”); see also, Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and
Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devotion?, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 429 (1996).
51. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52. Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 4, at 685-86.
53. Gasperini v. Ctr for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996); Chambers v. NASCO, 501
U.S. 32, 52 (1991); Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1988); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945).
54. Grupo Mexicano Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (1999);
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 3 (1987).
55. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 416 (excessive compensatory damages); Monessen, 486 U.S. at
335 (prejudgment interest).
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The conclusion of the Erie problem thus illustrates that the tort
reform statutes are not operating to channel the tort cases into federal
court. As such, they are not, in fact, jurisdictional statutes. Rather, they
are substantive changes in the law operating to prohibit certain factual
decisions on the merits of the damages award. It is an abuse of the
legislative prerogative to use jurisdiction and remedies as simple
expedients to deny the existence of a right.56 Such arbitrary legislative
action is held in check by due process guarantees of the federal and state
constitutions.
II. DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS IN THE RESTRICTION OF REMEDIES
The due process theory advanced in this article argues that
restricting the courts’ power to award an appropriate measure of
damages arbitrarily denies prevailing plaintiffs their fundamental right to
a meaningful remedy. Grounded in notions of liberty rights to redress of
wrongs and property rights, the due process analysis provides a check
upon potentially improper legislative action that restricts remedies. The
judicial application of due process to tort reform laws is a routine
counterbalancing of two branches of government that ensures legislative
accountability to constitutional principles and ultimately the people.
This traditional judicial function of constitutional oversight takes on
even more importance in an age where scholars have challenged the
assumption of the democratic, majoritarian legislature.57
The due process theory of evaluating tort reform is built upon the
recognition of the right to an adequate remedy as fundamental.58 There
is a foundational principle in law that assumes a right to a remedy,
embodied in the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right,
there must be a remedy).59 Whether this right is “fundamental” turns
56. “The General Assembly may not gain the authority to take away a constitutional right by
the simple expedient of limiting the jurisdiction of the courts to the parameters of its own
unconstitutional Act.” Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1094 (Ohio
1999).
57. Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch,
in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 123, 12530 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo, eds. 2005) (arguing that the dominance of interest
politics and the influence of corporate interests challenges the notion that legislature effectuates the
popular will and that the judiciary, rather than the legislature, may ultimately work to ratify public
preferences); see also Barry Friedman, The History of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 337-38 (1998); Richard H. Pildes &
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2128-43 (1990).
58. Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4, at 1636-40.
59. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1978).
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upon whether the right has been historically recognized or is central to
the concept of ordered liberty.60 The historical recognition of the right to
a remedy is evident in English common law which expressed the
necessity of a remedy to vindicate a legal right.61 This recognition was
incorporated into Marbury v. Madison, where the Supreme Court
emphasized the need for “proper redress” for every injury.62 From this
early time, state constitutions have adopted express guarantees of the
right to a remedy, and three-fourths of the states now provide: “All
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay.”63
Moreover, remedies are central to the concept of ordered liberty because
they define abstract rights by giving them meaning and effect in the real
world.64 Without remedies, a legal right is “nothing more than advice or
recommendation” and has no tangible impact upon real parties.65 A
remedy is thus the integral part of every right that is necessary to the
implementation of the rule of law.
Recognizing the existence of a fundamental right to an adequate
remedy alters the calculus by which courts should assess the legitimacy
of state action restricting remedies. It is no longer simply a question of
the superficial reasonableness of the economic legislation. Instead, a
new significant interest is added to the constitutional calculus that
requires a meaningful assessment of the state regulation. The operation
of a fundamental right demands a close tailoring between the legislation,
a compelling state interest, and the resulting regulatory ends.66 Using a

60. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
61. Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.); BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 23.
62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163-66 (1803) (“It is a general and indisputable rule, that where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded . . . . [F]or it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right,
when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”).
63. See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. art I, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13;
David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1992) (stating that thirtynine states have right to remedy clauses); Shannon M. Roesler, Comment, The Kansas Remedy by
Due Course of Law Provision: Defining a Right to a Remedy, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 655, 656-59
(1999).
64. Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4, at 1638-39; Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (stating that remedies generally “give meaning to ideas” in order that
they be “effective in the real world”).
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 159 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights
in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678 n.73 (1987).
66. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (noting that substantive due process “forbids the
government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests, no matter what process is provided,
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”).
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due process rubric of strict scrutiny provides the depth of judicial
scrutiny necessary to assess whether the legislative substitute remedy is
in fact meaningful and adequate.
Due process provides a preferred analytical alternative for
evaluating tort reform legislation.67 In the past, most structural
arguments for or against restriction of judicial remedies in tort reform
have been framed as issues of separation of powers in which the
legislative branch potentially usurps the power of the judiciary to redress
harms.68 The due process rubric offers a more definitive command
prohibiting arbitrary state action as compared to the shifting nuances of
balancing the separation of powers. Due process is an express
actionable claim that creates a line relatively more clear than usurpation
of governmental power.
Moreover, due process establishes an
overarching framework for testing the legitimacy of remedy restrictions
from both the legislative and judicial branches.69 Using a consistent
theory for evaluating the adequacy of all judicial remedies against
attempted abridgement streamlines the legal questions and provides a
mechanism for considering all of the relevant individual and societal
interests.70
Scholars and courts have assumed that the complete denial of the
right to a remedy through the use of jurisdictional restrictions would
violate due process.71 “No one would contend that a law of a State,
forbidding all redress by actions at law for injuries to property, would be
upheld in the courts of the United States, for that would be to deprive
one of his property without due process of law.”72 In cases over which

67. Professor John Goldberg offers a conceptually similar, yet analytically distinct argument.
See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law
for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 525 (2005). He argues for a procedural due process
protection for the common law right of tort defined as a law of redress and grounded in the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 613 n.426. Applying his framework to non-pecuniary damages caps, Goldberg
suggests that the caps might be valid because on their face they seem to “leave open a meaningful
avenue of redress.” Id. at 622.
68. Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 352 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that potential due process problems could be raised by congressional restriction of
remedy, but since “the constitutional question inherent in these possible circumstances does not
seem to be squarely addressed by any of our cases,” assessing the constitutional issue as one of
separation of powers).
69. See Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4, at 1640-45 (arguing that judicial denial of adequate
relief should be subject to strict scrutiny under due process).
70. See Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 358 (Utah 1989).
71. Weiman, supra note 9, at 28; Young, supra note 42, at 134-35; see, e.g., Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (interpreting statute so as not to exclude review of all constitutional
claims, as the denial of any judicial relief would “raise serious constitutional questions.”); see also
supra notes 70-72.
72. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884).
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the state courts have no judicial power, such as suits against federal
officials or habeas petitions for prisoners in federal custody, due process
concerns likely prevent curtailment of federal court jurisdiction because
no court would remain to hear the claim.73 Professor Henry Hart argued
a century ago in his seminal article that Congress cannot eliminate all
judicial authority to afford any remedy for constitutional rights.74 To
afford Congress the power to deny any remedy would “turn a mere
power to regulate jurisdiction into a power to affect rights having
nothing to do with jurisdiction,” and the power to regulate jurisdiction
cannot be exercised in a way that would violate other provisions of the
Constitution.75
The tort reform statutes, however, present a different question since
they selectively restrict, rather than eliminate, remedies for common-law
claims. When analyzing selective restrictions on remedies at the federal
level, Hart and others asserted that such a jurisdictional limitation on
remedies raises no constitutional issue, as long as some remedy
remains.76 Hart distinguished between constitutional rights, which had
some ultimate protection against abrogation, and statutory rights, which
fell fully into the legislative prerogative.77 “In Hart’s view, this power to
select among alternative remedies is true to the Madisonian Compromise
between the need to protect the supremacy of the Constitution and its
guaranteed rights and the need to subject the power of the judiciary to
meaningful political control.”78
Hart’s dialectic has been followed in the context of tort reform. For
example, in Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, the Virginia
Supreme Court held that the statutory cap on recoverable damages in a
medical malpractice action did not violate substantive due process
because of the availability of alternate remedies.79
A party has no fundamental right to a particular remedy or a full
recovery in tort. A statutory limitation on recovery is simply an

73. Weinberg, supra note 48, at 1423; see 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02, at S2297 (daily ed.
Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Associate Attorney General John Schmidt on the Prison Litigation
Reform Act testifying that absolute prohibition on structural injunctions in prisoner conditions cases
raises due process problems where such prohibitions would apply in both federal and state court).
74. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
75. Id. at 1372.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1372; see also Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 4 (distinguishing Congress’
power to restrict remedies for statutory rights from its power to restrict remedies for constitutional
rights).
78. Anderson, supra note 6, at 423-24.
79. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
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economic regulation, which is entitled to wide judicial deference. . . .
More to the point, the legislature has the power to provide, modify, or
repeal a remedy. Virginia alone can prescribe the jurisdiction of her
own courts. She can mould her remedies as she pleases. . . . She may
be bound to provide some remedy for wrong, but she is the exclusive
and sovereign judge of the form of the remedy.80

Thus, the mere existence of some alternative remedy remaining after the
state regulation has been deemed by some courts as sufficient to satisfy
due process.
The mere designation of an alternative remedy, however, does not
guarantee tangible redress for a legal wrong.
Commentators consistently promote a system of “substitutability” of
remedies and the Court regularly invokes the alternative remedy
rationale when it refuses requested remedial measures. Over the years,
however, as the full scope of remedial limitations has unfolded, the
notion of alternatives or substitutes that can effectively serve the
purpose of the principal remedy that has been foreclosed, has the
appearance of a “shell game.” Alternatives are promised, but they are
often denied, unavailable in practice, or riddled with exceptions that
seriously undermine their effectiveness. . . . Remedies have been
restricted on the theory that other remedies would be available, but in
too many cases the Court has failed to adjust the remedial scheme to
ensure the viability of this substitution process.81

In the absence of judicial inquiry into the merits of the remaining relief,
the plaintiff is not assured the minimum protection of the laws.
III. ADEQUACY AS A REQUIREMENT OF JUDICIAL RELIEF
An examination of legal history and judicial precedent in the state
and federal supreme courts supports the theory recognizing a
fundamental right to an adequate remedy protected by due process.
Tracing cases from 1845 to the present uncovers a solid foundation for
the right to an adequate remedy protected against legislative
abridgement. The cases define “adequacy” as an individualized inquiry
requiring meaningful benefit to the particular plaintiff.82 In addition,
80. Id. at 531.
81. Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 1212-13, 1254.
82. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690-91 (Tex. 1988) (stating that
required quid pro quo for tort reform restriction cannot be established by benefits to society
generally, but rather requires benefit to individual plaintiff); Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell,
757 P.2d 251, 264 (Kan. 1988) (holding that legislative caps on damages were inadequate because
they treated every injury identically and denied all remedy for plaintiff’s real losses exceeding the
cap), overruled by Blair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991).
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“adequacy” is a comparative term defined as that which is equally as
effective at redressing harm as the preexisting common law relief.83
Incorporating this requirement of adequacy into the existing framework
of remedial substitutability ensures that judicial remedies retain real
meaning to plaintiffs, while legislatures tinker with alternative solutions
to legal problems.
State court decisions assessing tort reform laws have adopted the
requirement of adequacy to qualify the legislature’s assumed prerogative
of selecting remedies. Grounding their decisions in state constitutional
guarantees of the right to a remedy, these courts have required that the
legislature provide an adequate alternative remedy.84 “The court looks
to insure that due process requirements are met, and when a commonlaw remedy is modified or abolished, an adequate substitute remedy
must be provided to replace it.”85 For a right to a remedy “cannot be
watered down by diluting the definition of remedy.”86
Accordingly, tort reform statutes that cap damages have been held
to violate constitutional remedial guarantees where they provide no
alternative remedy or commensurate benefit to the plaintiff.87 For
example, in Kansas Malpractice Victims v. Bell, the Kansas Supreme
Court probed into the adequacy of legislative tort remedies, searching
for an adequate and viable substitute to satisfy due process.88
“[S]tatutory modification of the common law must meet due process

83. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. E.g. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980); Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 163 (1919) (upholding legislative
remedial substitutes as adequate because they did not dramatically differ from the compensation
available at common law); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 139 (Utah 2004) (stating that benefit
provided by legislative remedial substitute must be substantially equal in value or benefit to the
remedy abrogated).
84. See Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 513 (Ohio 1994) (interpreting state constitutional
guarantee of remedy as encompassing the fundamental right to a “meaningful remedy” that provides
satisfaction for injuries sustained); Bell, 757 P.2d at 259, 264 ; Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691; Hardy v.
VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ohio 1987) (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining that the gist of
a right to a remedy violation is the absence of a reasonable alternative remedy); Smith v. Dep’t of
Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (holding damage cap invalid under right of access to the courts
because it provided no alternative remedy or commensurate benefit to the plaintiff). Cf. Judd, 103
P.3d at 139 (holding that legislature failed to provide an adequate substitute remedy, but sustaining
the inadequate remedy against constitutional challenge).
85. Bell, 757 P.2d at 260.
86. Id.
87. Id. (striking down tort reform statute capping damages in medical malpractice actions at
$250,000 for noneconomic damages and 1 million for aggregate damages); but see Samsel v.
Wheeler Transp. Servs. Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 557-58 (Kan. 1990) (overturning decision in Bell and
finding adequate quid pro quo provided by revised tort reform law interpreted to preclude all
remittiturs below the statutory cap of $250,000); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d. at 691; Smith, 507 So.2d 1080;
cf. Judd, 103 P.3d at 148 (Durham, J., dissenting).
88. Bell, 757 P.2d at 259.
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requirements . . . Due process requires that the legislative means
selected have a real and substantial relation to the objective sought. One
way to meet due process requirements is through substitute remedies.”89
Kansas focuses its adequate substitute requirement upon the existence of
a “quid pro quo” that provides the plaintiff with some benefit in
exchange for the retraction of a common-law remedy.90 Applying this
standard in Bell, the Kansas Court held that the substitute remedies
provided by the legislative cap on damages was inadequate because it
treats every injury identically, denies all remedy for real losses
exceeding the cap, and removes “a substantial right of the plaintiff and
gives him nothing in return.”91
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court applied a similar standard
of an adequate substitute remedy in evaluating its tort reform
legislation.92 The right to a remedy, the Court held, is satisfied “if the
law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative
remedy ‘by due course of law’ for vindication of his constitutional
interest. The benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially
equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated.”93 Utah thus
looks for a substitute remedy of equal or additional value to provide the
quid pro quo necessitated by the abridgment of the right to a remedy.94
Accordingly, in Judd v. Drezga, the court held that the mandated
adequate remedy was not found in the legislature’s cap on quality of life
damages.95
The question of whether tort reform caps on damages violate due
process by providing an inadequate substitute remedy was presented to
the U.S. Supreme Court in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group;
however, the Court denied certiorari.96 In Fein, the California Supreme
Court upheld a cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice
cases against a due process challenge.97 In dissenting from the denial of
certiorari, Justice White argued that the question of whether due process
required adequate relief in the tort context was of utmost importance.
Whether due process requires a legislatively enacted compensation
scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common-law or state-law remedy

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 258.
Id. at 264.
Judd, 103 P.3d at 139.
Id.
Id. at 139, 148.
Id. at 138.
474 U.S. 892 (1985).
695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985).
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it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an
issue unresolved by this Court, and one which is dividing the appellate
and highest courts of several States. The issue is important, and is
deserving of this Court’s review. Moreover, given the continued
national concern over the “malpractice crisis,” it is likely that more
States will enact similar types of limitations, and that the issue will
recur. I find, therefore, that the federal question presented by this
appeal is substantial, and dissent from the Court’s conclusion to the
contrary.98

Previously, the Supreme Court had upheld a congressional restriction on
recoverable damages for nuclear accidents in Duke Power v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group Inc.99 While declining to hold expressly
that an adequate substitute remedy was required by due process, the
Court went to great lengths to explain how the Price-Anderson Act did
in fact provide a “reasonably just substitute” for the common-law state
remedies that it replaced.100 The Court highlighted the legislative
assurances of certain recovery from a designated fund and the mandatory
waiver of defenses leading to no-fault liability as ample quid pro quo for
the uncertainty of liability and recovery under common law.101
The requirement of an adequate substitute remedy finds support in
earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases beginning in the nineteenth century. In
1845, Justice Story, dissenting in Cary v. Curtis, found the use of
jurisdiction to deprive a plaintiff of an adequate remedy to be
problematic.102 In Cary, the majority upheld a congressional
jurisdictional statute barring the common-law remedy of restitution
against a customs tax collector.103 The majority reasoned that Congress
had the power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and
emphasized the availability of alternative remedies in Hart-like
fashion.104 Justice Story, however, delved into the merits of the
substitute legislative remedy, finding it inadequate: “[W]hat ground is
there to suppose that Congress could intend to take away so important
and valuable a remedy, and leave our citizens utterly without any
adequate protection?”105 Story found the alternative remedies identified
by the majority (appealing to the executive’s discretion for repayment or

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Fein, 474 U.S. at 894-95 (White, J., dissenting).
438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Id.
Id.
44 U.S. 236, 254 (1845) (Story, J., dissenting).
Id. at 252.
Id. at 250; see Anderson, supra note 6.
44 U.S. at 255.
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refusing to pay the tax) to be circuitous and impractical.106 The total
elimination of one type of restitution remedy by the use of a
jurisdictional statute was, for Story, a misuse of judicial power.
Justice Story’s approach of inquiring into the adequacy of the
remedial substitute was adopted by the Supreme Court in a series of
cases in the early twentieth century challenging economic legislation
after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.107 In these cases, the
Court assessed the reasonableness of the legislative substitute remedy by
determining whether it substantially departed from the common-law
approach.108 For example, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes,
the defendant challenged a statutory double damages multiplier for
harms to livestock caused by railroads.109 A unanimous Court upheld
the double damages provision because it approximated a possible
remedy at common law since the jury had discretion to award damages
above pecuniary loss.110 A second example is seen in the workers’
compensation cases evaluating laws that precluded employees from
seeking tort compensation for workplace injuries.111 The Court
sustained the legislative substitutes against due process challenge finding
the regulation adequate because it did not dramatically differ from the
compensation available at common law.112 In addition, the Court, like
state courts in the quid pro quo cases, found that the legislature provided
an additional benefit to plaintiffs in easier liability rules and scheduled
damages.113
The rule of “adequate relief” as a standard for testing the
constitutionality of a substitute remedy finds additional support in
modern taxpayer cases in the Supreme Court.114 In these cases, the
Court found a denial of due process where prevailing plaintiffs were
denied meaningful and adequate remedies for a proven violation.115
While courts have flexibility to choose among appropriate equitable and
106. Id. at 256.
107. See Goldberg, supra note 67, at 568-72.
108. Id.
109. 115 U.S. 512 (1885).
110. Id. at 523.
111. Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 163 (1919); New York Central R.R.
v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
112. Middleton, 249 U.S. at 163; White, 243 U.S. at 202; see Goldberg, supra note 67, at 57374.
113. Middleton, 249 U.S. at 163; White, 243 U.S. at 202; see Goldberg, supra note 67, at 57374.
114. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109 (1994); Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,
101-02 (1993); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 39
(1990).
115. Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4, at 1641.
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monetary remedies, they cannot, consistent with due process, select a
remedy that fails to provide meaningful relief to the individual
plaintiff.116 The mere availability of alternative remedies did not
insulate the denial of damages from constitutional infirmity.
The Supreme Court’s cases on civil rights remedies continue this
pattern of focusing on the adequacy of the legislative substitute
remedy.117 In these cases, the Court asks whether the legislative
substitute is equally effective at protecting the constitutional right as the
judicial remedy.118 The civil rights cases, like the historical economic
legislation cases, engage in a comparison between the preexisting
judicial remedy and the legislative substitute. The nature of this
comparison, however, differs significantly based on the existence of a
constitutional fundamental right.119 The interplay of a fundamental right
mandates an “equally effective” remedy that provides an individualized
remedy that achieves the remedial goal at least as well as the judicial
remedy. For example, in Carlson v. Green, the Court held that a
restriction of mental distress damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act
failed to provide an equally effective remedy for an individual plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claims as the non-pecuniary damages available as a
remedy in federal court.120
Requiring an adequate substitute remedy is therefore the threshold
question in a constitutional challenge to remedy restrictions under due
process. Courts would first inquire as to the existence of an adequate
substitute remedy in order to determine whether the legislation

116. Id. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 102 (“[Virginia] is free to choose which form of relief it will
provide, so long as that relief satisfies the minimum federal requirements we have outlined. State
law may provide relief beyond the demands of federal due process, but under non circumstances
may it confine petitioners to a lesser remedy.”).
117. Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 4, at 756-66. E.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000) (striking congressional remedy for a Miranda violation finding it not “as equally as
effective” in protecting the constitutional right as the judicial prophylactic remedy of mandatory
advanced warnings); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (invalidating the Federal Tort Claims
Act’s prohibition of mental distress damages for prisoner civil rights claims because the legislative
remedy was not as effective at protecting constitutional rights as the judicial remedy).
118. Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 4, at 756-66.
119. Where remedies for statutory rights are restricted, legislatures are less likely to run into
due process problems since legislatures have the power to create or eviscerate the very right itself,
and thus can accomplish that same result via a remedy restriction. Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra
note 4, at 742-43. Constitutional rights, and common-law rights, however, differ in their creation
independent of the legislature and in their significance for the rule of law. See Walter Dellinger, Of
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1972);
Goldberg, supra note 67, at 529 (finding a constitutional basis for the common-law tort right to
redress).
120. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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significantly burdens the fundamental remedial right.121 In the tort
reform context, the Utah Supreme Court found without question that
damages caps constituted an inadequate substitute. “It is self-evident
that the cap on the quality of life damages, which does nothing more
than reduce [plaintiff]’s recovery, does not provide a substitute remedy
substantially equal to that abrogated.”122 In the absence of an adequate
substitute, the state interference with the right to a remedy would be
subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny.123 However, where courts find an
adequate substitute remedy, as in the cases where a new benefit or quid
pro quo is available, the legislative remedy is sufficient and no further
judicial scrutiny is required.124
IV. CHANGING BUSINESS AS USUAL IN ECONOMIC DUE PROCESS CASES
Explicitly recognizing the fundamental right to a remedy
significantly alters the existing framework from which courts have
reviewed challenges to tort reform statutes. Most state courts analyzing
due process challenges to tort reform statutes have scrutinized this social
and economic legislation under a rational basis standard.125 Finding that
the legislation bears some rational connection to plausible social and
economic goals, the courts have upheld the statutes against challenge.126
121. Judd, 103 P.3d at 139 (finding as threshold question that cap on quality of life damages
did not provide substitute remedy substantially equal to that provided by the common law).
122. Id.
123. An analytical parallel to this framework can be drawn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on legislative restrictions on the fundamental right to marry. See Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Court first asks whether the legislation burdens the fundamental right by
“significantly interfering” with the right to marry. Id. at 381. Only where significant interference is
found will the Court subject the regulation to strict scrutiny; otherwise, laws are reviewed under
rational basis. Id. at 386; see Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 669 F.2d 67
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934) (delaying mortgage holder’s right to repossession during Depression did
not deny right to a remedy).
124. See, e.g., Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 601 (Ind. 1980); Sibley v. Bd.
of Supervisors, 477 So.2d 1094 (1988); Butler v. Flint Goodridge Hosp., 607 So.2d 517, 521 (La.
1992) (finding quid pro quo benefit provided in tort reform statute capping non-pecuniary damages
where statute assured continuation of viable medical malpractice insurance industry). But see Bell,
757 P.2d at 259, 264 (holding that continuing medical malpractice insurance was not a new benefit
to the plaintiff achieved by the tort reform statute itself).
125. See e.g., Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1337 (D. Md. 1989); Judd,
103 P.3d at 143; Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50, 53 (Me. 1991); Fein v. Permanente Group, 695 P.2d
665, 680 (Cal. 1985); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691. See Light, supra note 9, at 319 (“[D]ue
process . . . analyses all rest upon rational basis review.”); Carly Kelly & Michelle Mello, Are
Medical Malpractice Caps Constitutional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J. MED. L. & ETHICS
515, 516 (2005) (“We conclude that damages caps passed as a response to documented strains in the
liability insurance market are generally upheld against constitutional challenges. . . .”).
126. Judd, 103 P.3d at 139-42; Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509
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Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a minimal scrutiny
standard for reviewing economic legislation challenged under due
process grounds. In cases decided soon after the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reviewed economic legislation in due
process cases under a deferential standard, upholding state laws that
provided reasonably adequate remedies. Then for over forty years
during the Lochner era, the Court struck down over 200 economic
regulations on due process grounds under a higher standard of scrutiny
on grounds that they interfered with a liberty of contract.127 Strong
rejection of Lochner beginning with the New Deal era led the Court to
abandon even the nineteenth-century minimal inquiry of adequacy and
in its place adopt a “strategy of extreme deference to the legislature in
economic due process cases.”128
The Court proclaimed in one opinion, “So far as the requirement of
due process is concerned, . . . a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare . . . . Under this approach, . . . state laws were granted a
presumption of constitutionality that could be overcome only by
showing them to be clearly irrational or unreasonable. In other words,
minimal judicial scrutiny became the Court’s modus operandi in cases
involving economic legislation challenged as violative of the Due
Process Clause.
Minimal scrutiny, however, is something of a misnomer. In fact,
minimal scrutiny is so deferential as to be virtually nonexistent. In
economic due process cases, then, where minimal scrutiny is operative,
the Court functions as a rubber stamp for statutory enactments,
abandoning all oversight of the legislature. As a result, in cases
involving economic legislation the Due Process Clause has no
efficacy.129

After 1937, “Lochnerism” became shorthand for judicial activism
and improper judicial review of state regulation.130 However, the
S.E.2d 307, 318 (Va. 1999). But see Lucas, 757 S.W.2d 687 (striking down damages cap under
rational basis review of due process challenge); Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients
Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005) (striking down cap on non-economic damages
for medical malpractice cases under rational basis “with teeth” review in equal protection
challenge).
127. Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner, 72 TENN. L. REV. 455, 496
(2005). In Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a maximum hour law for New York bakers
on due process grounds holding that the state’s regulation impermissibly interfered with the bakers’
fundamental liberty to contract. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
128. Shaman, supra note 127, at 491.
129. Id. at 491-92.
130. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
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problem with Lochner is not its use of heightened review under
substantive due process.131 Rather, Lochner’s invalidity stems primarily
from its now-discredited recognition of a fundamental liberty of
contract.132 The Court’s substitution of its own laissez-faire economic
agenda for the protective interests of the New York legislature, and the
Court’s refusal to test the legitimacy of the legislature’s motivations
against empirical evidence and data, fueled the criticism of the decision
that led to a constitutional crisis.133 Yet even the dissenting Justice
Harlan applied a strict scrutiny standard using alternative economic
assumptions and factual information submitted in the case to uphold the
New York maximum hour law for bakers.134 Harlan’s application of
strict scrutiny that challenges pretextual legislative motives and demands
empirical and factual support for legislation is precisely the standard of
judicial review advanced here.
Some have argued that the Supreme Court may have “overreacted”
to Lochner and its political fallout by abandoning exacting due process
review for all economic legislation.135 The Court certainly has not
abandoned substantive due process review in whole. Indeed, substantive
due process review under a heightened standard has flourished under the
Court’s privacy cases.136 This use of substantive due process to
challenge state regulation is alive and well, and lends support to the use
of heightened analysis for fundamental remedial rights.137

Historicism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 677 (2005); George L. Priest, The Constitutionality of State Tort
Reform Measures and Lochner, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 683 (2001) (arguing against a Lochner-like
approach to evaluating tort reform and advocating an economic efficiency driven approach).
131. Balkin, supra note 130, at 678; Shaman, supra note 127, at 491 (summarizing arguments
to this effect). See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins
of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L. J. 1, 12 (2003) (arguing for a renewed focus
on Lochner’s primary jurisprudential importance as an originator of constitutional analysis of
fundamental liberties).
132. Shaman, supra note 127, at 491.
133. Balkin, supra note 130, at 686; Shaman, supra note 127, at 592 (citing Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) and its holding that “the day is gone when this Court uses the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought” and Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941), “We are not
concerned . . . with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.”).
134. Shaman, supra note 127. The Court’s continued invalidation of legislation for economic
and labor protections enacted during the Depression led President Franklin Roosevelt to threaten the
Court with his plan of expanding the Court to fifteen justices and mandating retirement for senior
Justices. Id. at 497.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 499.
137. Bernstein, supra note 131, at 12; Robert Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages:
The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 869 (1991) (“Substantive due process thus
continues alive and well, although its application to punitive damages appears to have much more in
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Moreover, the Court has signaled a return to substantive review of
economic regulation in the punitive damages cases.138 In these cases,
BMW v. Gore139 and State Farm v. Campbell,140 the Court has adopted a
heightened standard of scrutiny to review the award of punitive damages
under state law. The protection of a fundamental property right to
money damages has justified the adoption of a heightened review of the
challenged remedy. In assessing the arbitrariness of punitive damages
awards under the Due Process Clause, the Court has adopted a
demanding standard of scrutiny that requires that the interest served by
the judicial action be compelling in light of the reprehensibility of the
defendants’ conduct and that it be narrowly tailored to the amount of
compensatory damages and regulatory sanctions.141 Extending this
heightened scrutiny of punitive damages to the related tort issue of nonpecuniary damages is a small stretch, regardless of whether the courts
are evaluating arbitrariness at the ceiling or floor of relief.142
The strict scrutiny calculus as applied to the remedial jurisdiction
stripping statutes, and tort remedy restrictions in general, would demand
compelling state interests for the remedial restrictions that were
accomplished through the least restrictive legislative alternative.143 In
the few cases that have subjected tort reform statutes to heightened
scrutiny in the past, the legislation has been struck down.144 Tort reform
damages caps have also been invalidated by state courts applying an

common with the old economic substantive due process, now largely disavowed, than with the new
substantive due process of privacy and fundamental rights.”).
138. Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (2005)
(endorsing expanded substantive due process review beyond punitive damages to all tort damages);
Shaman, supra note 127, at 501-02 (“A majority of the Court, then, appears willing to revive
economic substantive due process review in this specialized area of the law that overlaps with
procedural concerns.”).
139. BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
140. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
141. Other scholars have agreed with an expanded use of the economic due process analysis in
the context of tort damages, but have sought to achieve a judicial ceiling rather than a minimum
flooring for arbitrary awards. Geistfeld, supra note 138, at 1107-08; Paul DeCamp, Beyond State
Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 231 (2003).
142. See DeCamp, supra note 141; see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416 (discussing close
parallel between noneconomic and punitive damages).
143. Cf. Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 456
(Wis. 2005) (stating that, if strict scrutiny applied in that case, that the Defendant would have the
burden of proving that the statutory “cap on noneconomic damages . . . promotes a compelling
governmental interest and that it is the least restrictive means for doing so”)
144. Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961 (1984); Bell, 757 P.2d at 259; Morris, 576 N.E.2d at
780-81 (Sweeney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate
damages cap).
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intermediate level of scrutiny.145
These courts have found the
importance, but not the fundamentality, of the right to a remedy to merit
more judicial scrutiny than the usual deferential review.
This
application of a heightened standard does not mean the per se
invalidation of tort reform remedy restrictions; instead, it requires more
reasoned justification from the legislature than currently exists.146
Under strict scrutiny, the state bears a more significant burden in
justifying its economic legislation with a compelling, rather than
superficially rational interest.147 The Court will delve more closely into
the interests asserted for the legislation to determinewhether they are
meritorious or pretextual.148 It will no longer be possible for the state to
rely upon “common sense” to justify its economic legislation.149 Rather
than merely giving the state carte blanche to legislate, the court will
inquire as to the credibility of the asserted economic interest.150
Certainly many have discredited the asserted state interests of tort reform
that purport to solve the problem of the litigation explosion, the runaway
145. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 831(N.H. 1980) (equal protection challenge);
Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (requiring a “real and substantial relation” between
the damages caps and the state’s interest); Knowles ex rel. Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W.2d
183 (N.D. 1996); see also Ferdon,701 N.W.2d at 460-61 (applying “rational basis with teeth” to
strike down caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions).
146. Geistfeld, supra note 138, at 1094 (“Constitutional tort reform therefore can serve the
valuable role of forcing state courts and legislatures to identify more clearly the substantive
objectives of tort law, an issue of critical importance that has not been adequately addressed by the
reform movements of the last century.”).
147. Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“Indeed, our cases demonstrate that there are limits on governmental authority to abolish ‘core’
common-law rights, including rights against trespass, at least without a compelling showing of
necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy.”).
148. See Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1266 (2004) (concluding that non-economic damages caps
discriminate against women based upon research showing that women are awarded greater shares of
non-economic damage awards, while men obtain greater economic and total damage awards);
Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463,
467, 499-502 (1998) (arguing that there is gender bias implicit in the devaluation of non-pecuniary
and emotional loss).
149. When the Republican Party gained control of both houses of Congress in 1994, tort
reform was a critical component of the House Republicans’ platform, “Contract with America,”
which called for a variety of tort reforms designated the “Common Sense reform bills.” Note,
“Common Sense Legislation”: The Birth of Neoclassic Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769
(1996); see also Benjamin H. Davidson, et. al., Texas Statutory Caps and Settlement Credits After
House Bill 4, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1225 (2005) (“Describing the caps as a balance of ‘commonsense’ tort reform and protection of injured parties’ rights.”); Light, supra note 9, at 350 (“Intuition
suggests that reducing large tort awards will reduce the level of the premiums necessary to fund the
awards. This may be factually wrong, but it is at least plausible.”).
150. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973) (searching for “concrete evidence” to
support the government’s “questionable” explanation of its statutory scheme in strict scrutiny
analysis under due process).
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juries, or the insurance crisis.151 Moreover, it could be argued that the
legislative interests of protecting big business and repeat wrongdoers
from accepting the externalities of their illegal actions fails to meet the
compelling interest standard.152
Under the second prong of a strict scrutiny analysis, courts would
examine tort reform legislation to ensure that the statutes are sufficiently
tailored or connected to the compelling interest. Courts applying
heightened scrutiny to tort reform statutes in the past have struck down
laws that are underinclusive by forcing only the most severely injured
victims to bear the full social responsibility of insuring health care.153 It
could also be argued that the tailoring connection is not met by imposing
penalties for frivolous lawsuits on prevailing plaintiffs with meritorious
claims. Tailoring questions are also raised by the fact that total
compensatory damages have risen despite the non-economic caps, and
by suggestions that these increases in economic damages may be
exacerbated by the enactment of non-economic damages caps.154 In
151. Peck, supra note 9, at 843-60; Kathryn Zeiler, Turning From Damages Caps to
Information Disclosure: An Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 385
(2005) (asserting that statutory caps on medical malpractice damages are not effective in addressing
health insurance concerns).
152. See Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 464.
The primary, overall legislative objective is to ensure the quality of health care for the
people of Wisconsin. The legislature obviously did not intend to reach this objective by
shielding negligent health care providers from responsibility for their negligent actions.
After all, it is a major contradiction to legislate for quality health care on one hand, while
on the other hand, in the same statute, to reward negligent health care providers. A cap
on noneconomic damages diminishes tort liability for health care providers and
diminishes the deterrent effect of tort law.
Id. at 464.
Wealthy interests with experience as disappointed defendants given to habitual
negligence or intentional recklessness, use their raw political power to take their
complaints to the legislature in order to rig the legal system in their favor. . . . [they] seek
to hijack the civil justice system so that it does not serve the objective of redressing
grievances but instead minimizes liability for wrongdoing.
Peck, supra note 9, at 856-60, 894-95; see also Daniel J. Capra, An Accident and a Dream:
Problems with the Latest Attack on the Civil Justice System, 20 PACE L. REV. 339 (2000).
153. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1094-95; cf. Ferdon, 701 N.W. 2d at 465 (“Those who suffer the
most severe injuries will not be fully compensated for their noneconomic damages, while those who
suffer relatively minor injuries with lower noneconomic damages will be fully compensated.”). See
also Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1378-79 (1990). The author states that:
By analogy to the takings clause, the Court could declare that the due process clause
“bars Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Thus, laws that single
out one group to bear an economic burden that cannot fairly be said to have been caused
by that group effect an impermissible end.
Id.
154. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Caps and the Construction of Damages in Medical
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addition, it could be argued that capping damages is not the “least
restrictive alternative.” Capping damages for all tort plaintiffs appears
overly broad and as compared to narrower limitations on damages that
are excessive, unsupported by the evidence, or significantly out of line
with similar awards.155 This more demanding tailoring is necessitated by
the involvement of a fundamental right to an adequate remedy.
V. CONCLUSION
A stricter standard of scrutiny for tort reform statutes holds
legislatures accountable for their actions. It blocks attempts to
circumvent public scrutiny through the evasive technique of remedies
stripping. Legislatures are required to provide sound reasons for their
economic decisionmaking that can be supported with reliable data and
logical analysis. The accountability and reliability achieved with the
strict scrutiny standard directs states to legislate in a way that does not
misuse remedies simply to accomplish political ends.

Malpractice Cases, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: NEW
CENTURY, DIFFERENT ISSUES 148-66 (Rogan Kersh & William Sage, eds. forthcoming 2006)
(manuscript on file with the Akron Law Review).
155. See Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988).

